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Alan Rumsey
One of the most prominent developments in the highlands of Papua
New Guinea over the past quarter century has been a resurgence of war-
fare.! Much of this warfare and other violence has occurred at the inter-
face between electoral politics and more "traditional" forms of social
organization. On the one hand the elections themselves, and their out-
comes, have precipitated deadly fights among the kinds of segmentary
social units known as tribes, clans, and so on (Dinnen 1996; Ketan 1998;
A Strathern 1992, 1993; Standish 1996).
On the other hand, the imposition of government with its national,
provincial, and local electorates has added new forms and levels of seg-
mentation to the previously existing ones, and these have themselves
come to figure as new axes of organized violence. Here I examine the
nature and degree of articulation between the older forms of segmenta-
tion and the newer, electoral ones. While the close relationship between
these as matrices of violence is widely appreciated in the literature (eg,
Strathern 1974, 1992, 1993; Burton 1989; Ketan 1996; Standish 1996),
I argue that this relationship is in need of further clarification. Although
the influence of "traditional" segmentary politics on the "electoral" has
been well documented, the converse impact has not. To help fill this gap,
I offer some ethnographic evidence and use it to develop conclusions
about sources of violence in present-day Papua New Guinea. I then ask
what can be done about it and bring my ethnographic examples to bear
on a proposal that has now been around for some time in Papua New
Guinea, namely the return to a system of preferential voting as opposed
to the present first-past-the-post system.
The ethnographic evidence on which my argument is based comes
from the Ku Waru region of the Western Highlands of Papua New
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Guinea, where Francesca Merlan and I have been doing fieldwork on and
off since 1981. Before introducing the Ku Waru case I turn first to a rel-
evant discussion by Andrew Strathern of the relation between electoral
and "tribal" segmentation among the nearby Melpa people, and some
later work on electoral politics that has been influenced by it.
"TRIBES," ELECTORATES, AND VOTING PATTERNS
In his classic 1974 article, "When Dispute Procedures Fail," Strathern
described two disputes that broke out in the late sixties and early seven-
ties among Melpa groups near Mount Hagen. Both were precipitated by
motor vehicle accidents. In the first a vehicle from the Mul council area
knocked down an old man while passing through the Dei area, where-
upon the driver was pulled out and beaten to death by Mul people. In the
second dispute, a bridge collapsed under the weight of a car full of
Kumndi people returning to the Mul council area from a funeral feast put
on by Jika people in Hagen Central council. Both disputes escalated to
the point where whole council areas opposed each other as blocks, in
effect adding a higher level of segmentation at which thousands of peo-
ple where brought into opposition as "Dei" versus "Mul"and "Mul" ver-
sus "Hagen Central." In both cases, Strathern argued, the disputes were
made harder to settle by the fact that council boundaries corresponded
with tribal ones: Jika and others versus Kumndi and others with Hagen
Central versus Mul, and so forth. "Whereas before . . . there was only
the tribal system of politics controlled from above by a monolithic
Administration, now [in the era of self-government] there are new seg-
mentary political identities [local, provincial, and national electorates],
and where the boundaries of these coincide with previous boundaries
between hostile tribes the probability of failure in dispute settlement
increases" (Strathern 1974, 266).
More recent studies by other scholars have corroborated this claim
about the rise of new segmentary identities. Scholars have often stressed
the importance of traditional segmentary boundaries in electoral politics
as a determinant of voting patterns and of the disputes that arise over
electoral outcomes.2 Saffu referred to this concept in pure form as the
"traditional community vote thesis," that "politics at all levels ... are
organised along traditional structural lines" (1996,40).3 It can be seen as
one aspect of a more general understanding of postcolonial politics in
Papua New Guinea as a process of what Gordon and Meggitt (1985,
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181) called "upward colonization [whereby] [f]ar from being displaced
or neutralized by the downward thrust of central authority, local politi-
cal traditions have proved remarkably resilient and, in many cases have
successfully penetrated the state"{Dinnen 1996, 82; compare Standish
1992).
To me, these ways of putting the matter are illuminating and useful,
but I think they are in need of some refinements. As all the writers cited
would probably agree, history is never just a matter of assimilating new
social forms and experiences to prior ones, and even where people try
their hardest to do so, there are always unforeseen consequences and
unexpected outcomes. Marilyn Strathern has said (in the context of talk
in Britain about the revival of "traditional values") that one of the most
powerful engines for social change is the deliberate, self-conscious
attempt to keep things as they are (1992). In my experience, New Guinea
Highlanders do not try to keep things as they are, or at least do not think
of themselves as doing so, so the question here becomes the converse of
her proposition, namely, "To what extent and in what ways do people
reproduce the old even in the attempt to engage with the new?"
The evidence I bring to bear on this question concerns some relation-
ships in the Ku Waru area between ceremonial exchange (moka or, as it
is called in Ku Waru, makayl), marriage patterns, electoral politics, and
organized violence. As necessary background for that discussion, I need
to say a bit about the segmentary identities in the area, patterns of
alliance and hostility, and electoral boundaries.
THE Ku WARU REGION
The Ku Waru region is in the Western Highlands Province, along the east-
ern slopes of the Tambul Range overlooking the Nebilyer Valley, about
fifteen kilometers southwest of Mount Hagen town (map I). "Ku Waru"
and all other such regional designations in this part of New Guinea are
evanescent, cross-cutting ones that group certain people together in cer-
tain contexts who in other contexts are differently identified. The most
extensive regional identifications are generally made only by people out-
side the region in question. It is only the Melpa, for example, who have
a term for all Nebilyer Valley people and dialects in general, Temboka,
just as the term Melpa was itself originally used for only a small portion
of the people who later became identified in that way from the Mount
Hagen perspective (Strauss 1990).
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The literal meaning of Ku Waru is "steep stone" or "cliff'." The refer-
ence is to the prominent limestone cliffs that loom above the area on the
eastern face of the Tambul Range and on clear days are visible through-
out much of the Nebilyer Valley. Designating the region and its people in
this way distinguishes them from the people who inhabit the even more
densely settled and intensively cultivated areas on the valley floor near the
Nebilyer River (map 2), whom the Ku Waru people call Meam. Histor-
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ically, the Ku Waru people nearest to the Tambul Range, with whom
Francesca Merlan and I have lived at Kailge, have had closer ties to peo-
ple living on the other side of the range in the eastern Kaugel Valley (three
or four hours' walk over well-established tracks through the montane
forest) than they have had with Meam people, all their immediate neigh-
bors on that side having been their traditional enemies. The Ku Waru
dialect is closer to the one spoken immediately across the range than it is
to the Meam dialects, no doubt due in part to extensive intermarriage
across the range (as I describe in more detail later).
As elsewhere in the New Guinea Highlands, named segmentary social
groupings-clans, tribes, and the like-eontinue to playa big part in Ku
Waru people's lives, notwithstanding the changes that have occurred in
other respects. Both land and people are still identified by such segmen-
tary labels, in much the same way as Merlan and I have described in our
earlier writings based on fieldwork in the 1980s, which in turn are broad-
ly similar to what Andrew Strathern and Marilyn Strathern described
regarding the Melpa region not far to the east. Although the wide varia-
tion in the size of maximal named groups makes it hard to specify levels
in terms of a standardized hierarchical schema (tribe, clan, subclan, and
so on), there are elaborate segmentary gradations of "sameness" and
"difference," and a close and systematic correspondence between these
and patterns of marriage, residence, land tenure, exchange, alliance, and
hostility (Merlan and Rumsey 1991, 34-87).
To some extent, this sliding scale of sameness versus difference may be
calibrated demographically in a fairly consistent way across the Hagen-
Nebilyer area irrespective of the dramatic differences in the size of maxi-
mal-level named groups. For example, the Ulka tribe numbers at least five
thousand people, with six levels of named subdivisions, while the Epola,
Alya, Lalka, Kusika, and Midipu tribes to the west (map 2) are all of less
than two hundred people each, with no more than three levels of named
subgroupings. At the top level of segmentation the Ulka are divided into
two groupings, between which there is free intermarriage. At the second
level some Ulka segments have been involved in major hostilities with
each other in the past and now conduct makayl ceremonial exchanges
with each other. By contrast, the Epola, Alya, Lalka, Kusika, and Midipu
are allies of long standing, do not regularly intermarry, do not conduct
ceremonial exchanges with each other, and all occupy a single compact
region, of approximately four square kilometers. In other words, rela-
tions among people within Ulka segments that each have three hundred
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to six hundred people are similar to relations among the approximately
five hundred people in the five small tribes to the west. I now consider the
relationship between these segmentary identities and aspects of electoral
politics.
Ku WARU LOCAL AND REGIONAL POLITICS
The main point of reference for Merlan's and my view of segmentary pol-
itics in the Ku Waru area is that of the Kopia line (talapi), with whom we
have lived during most of our fieldwork there, and their neighboring,
paired line, the Kubuka (map 2). We have also had a lot of close contact
with people in all the nearby lines: Kusika, Midipu, Epola, Alya, Lalka,
Tea, Dena. Before the pax Australiana (in the late I940S) all of these lines
were, as already mentioned, major enemies of the Kopia-Kubuka. They
were routed from their present location in a war that probably took place
in the early forties, and fled in various directions, many of them across
the Tambul Range to the west, where they had connections by marriage
or through their mothers (for details see Merlan and Rumsey I99I,
48-49).
At the time of our initial fieldwork in I98I-I983, based on the census
data and genealogies we collected of the entire Kopia and Kubuka lines,
we found that there had been a strong tendency for men of these lines to
marry women from over the Tambul Range. A clear plurality of the
women who married into both these lines-I6 for Kopia and I3 for
Kubuka-eame from the Laulku tribe, whose territories lie immediately
over the range to the west (map 2). This finding came as no surprise to
Ku Waru people: by I98I this particular kind of marriage was prevalent
enough to have become a stereotype, such that when I became identified
by "adoption"as a Kopia man, my wife, Francesca, as a matter of course
became identified as a Laulku woman, so as to complete the fiction in the
most probable-or as Pierre Bourdieu would say "officializing"-manner
(I977, 38-43).
The next most frequent kind of marriage for both Kopia and Kubuka
men was to women from Palimi, also located over the Tambul Range, to
the northwest (map 2), with 8 and 9 such marriages respectively. Overall
there had been a clear tendency for women to marry into this area of the
Nebilyer Valley from over the range. When we looked at the marriages of
Kopia and Kubuka women, there was no corresponding tendency for
them to marry over the range. As compared with the total of 29 Laulku
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women married to Kopia and Kubuka men, there were only 6 Kopia-
Kubuka women married to Laulku men. Overall, there was much less of
a tendency for Kopia-Kubuka women's marriages to be to men who were
concentrated in particular lines. They were more randomly distributed,
but generally to men in nearby lines within the Nebilyer Valley and points
east.
The clear directionality of women's marriages into the Ku Waru region
from over the Tambul Range had not been constant over the recon-
structible past. From comparing the marriages on our genealogies across
the generation levels going back to about 1920, it was clear that the
trend had intensified in the colonial and postcolonial periods. We
surmised, and Ku Waru people agreed, that these marriage patterns had
been strongly influenced by differences in people's perceived socio-
economic prospects on either side of the range. These are widely agreed
to be more favorable on the Nebilyer side, which is better for cash-
cropping (including coffee) because of its lower altitude, temperate, frost-
free climate, and greater proximity to markets in Mount Hagen:
"[D]ifferences in directionality of marriage between men and women
indicate that men as seekers in the marriage quest, requiring substantial
wealth [for bride price], are more likely to be able to gain brides from
areas where they are perceived to have social connections with, and
material advantage relative to, wife givers. But a wife is perceived as
desirable even if her kin have less material endowment and prospects
than her husband's: she herself is a key valuable"(Merlan and Rumsey
1991, 80-81).4
As elsewhere in the New Guinea Highlands, Nebilyer ceremonial
exchange (makayl) relations are built on links through women (ie, mar-
riage and matrilateral kinship). In the Nebilyer area this is true of
exchange in both its interpersonal and intergroup dimensions, although
the intergroup links often lag behind because of the very long time scale
over which those exchange cycles take place. As of 1983, the concentra-
tion of Kopia-Kubuka men's marriages into the Laulku line had not yet
led to the establishment of a makayl exchange relationship between either
of these lines and the Laulku line as such. Instead their intergroup
exchanges for the previous twenty-five years or so had been with each
other and with their old allies the Poika and Palimi lines to the northwest
(map 2). But in 1982, the Laulku were recruited by Kopia into a fight into
which they had themselves been recruited by their former enemies Kusika
and Midipu. We subsequently witnessed a dramatic attempt by the lead-
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ing Kopia big-man, Noma, to use this as a basis on which to initiate a
new makayl relationship between Kopia and the Laulku (along with their
paired line, the Mujika). In a dazzling display of precisely crafted and tar-
getedel ung oratory, Noma invoked an old unpaid debt they owed to
Kopia, suggesting that the payment being given by Kopia to Mujika-
Laulku on that day be taken as an initiatory payment to be reciprocated
by a much larger payment by those lines to Kopia (for details see Merlan
and Rumsey 1991, 147-152).
By 1989, Noma's gambit seemed to be working. We heard in a letter
from Kailge in November of that year that Mujika and Laulku had
agreed to make a major payment of live pigs to Kopia in the following
year (1990). This planned prestation by Laulkuhas never happened.
During 1990 and 1991 people from Laulku kept promising it, but con-
tinued to put it off. In 1992 relations between Kopia and Laulku took a
sudden turn that is now thought to have probably ended the possibility
of it ever happening. I was not on the scene at the time and did not hear
in any detail about what had happened until I returned to Kailge in 1997.
From the retrospective viewpoint of five years later, the change in rela-
tions was said to be due to a single incident arising from the 1992 elec-
tion. In order to describe that incident I must introduce some relevant
details of electoral politics, which have become much more important
among Ku Waru people during the past two decades.
When I first read Andrew Strathern's 1974 article after our initial field-
work at Kailge in 1981~1983 I was struck by how much more centrally
electoral boundaries seemed to figure in the social lives of the Melpa
people he worked with in the 1970S than they did even a decade later at
Kailge, even though we had been there during the year of a national
election (1982). Visiting candidates for the Tambul-Nebilyer seat had
been politely received, and votes duly cast, but without any great fuss
or effort to arrive at a determination of how the community should vote
as a block. As a topic of discussion, the election figured far less centrally
in 1982 than certain local land disputes, a war with neighboring tribes
that the Kopia-Kubuka had been brought into, or the development of
business ventures such as those pursued by a local women's groupS-in
none of which electoral politics played any conspicuous part. By 1997
things had come to look a lot more like the situation described by
Strathern, perhaps in part due to a loss of faith in other possible avenues
of "development."
When we settled at Kailge in 1981, the community school in the area
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had been open for only nine years, so the first local youths to reach high
school were still students, and marvelous things were expected of them.
Especially after the 1979 surge in world coffee prices, people were opti-
mistic about the prospect of economic development, and indeed could see
it happening very close by in the person of Lkirim, a Midipu man who
had successfully parleyed the profits from his own coffee holdings into a
sizable coffee-buying and transport business based at the nearby village
of Palimung. Here as in the middle Sepik case so well described by Colin
Filer "local villagers ... had not [yet] come to think of 'business' as a
game they could never win" (1996, 209). But by the time I returned to
Kailge in 1997, the earlier optimism had waned considerably. Lkirim's
business had failed, very few of the local school Ieavers had found jobs,
and, as elsewhere in Papua New Guinea, kina devaluation and low agri-
cultural commodity prices had probably left people with less buying
power than they had fifteen years ago. While Ku Waru people are as pas-
sionately committed as ever to the goal of "development," they now seem
to be fixed much more exclusively on winning a stake in government
(gabman) as the way to achieve it.
Another reason why Ku Waru people have become more concerned
with elections than they were in 1982 is, no doubt, the fact that they now
have a local candidate to support-Simon Noma. The most powerful
man of his generation at Kailge (now about fifty years old), Simon is the
son of Councillor Noma, mentioned earlier, who was the leading Kopia
big-man of his generation and is now about seventy-five. Unlike his
father, Simon has not spent much of his adult life at Kailge, preferring to
live in Port Moresby, and Mount Hagen, where he has personal connec-
tions dating back to his boyhood, when his family relocated after the rout
of Kopia people from Kailge. But he usually returns to Kailge in election
years. In 1988 he was elected to the local, Upper Nebilyer seat in the
Western Highlands Provincial government, which he held until the
provincial assemblies were suspended in 1995. For most of that time he
held a cabinet position as minister for finance.
In 1992 Simon tried to move up into the national arena, running for
the Tambul-Nebilyer seat, which takes in the whole of the Kaugel Valley,
most of the Nebilyer Valley, and the sparsely populated West Kambia
region (map 3). In the previous two national elections (1982 and 1987),
no one had run for this seat from the Ku Waru region, and votes from the
Kopia and Kubuka lines had been committed to Thomas Negints, from
the Ulka line. But by 1992, Negints was perceived to be in a weaker posi-
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tion, for several reasons. First, after staking his reputation on his activi-
ties as a peacemaker, he was faced with a revival of warfare between his
own line, Ulka, and their old enemies the Kulka, in which over a hundred
people were killed between 1989 and 1991. This not only undercut his
credibility outside the Ulka line, but lost him votes within it, because he
refused to supply guns and ammunition to his own people. A second,
probably related, factor was that Negints's position had been undermined
when his former People's Democratic Movement (PDM) ally and patron
Paias Wingti encouraged another Ulka man to run for the seat, thereby
splitting the Ulka vote. This strengthened the position of the other PDM
candidate, Vincent Awali from over on the Tambul side, who went on to
win the election (an outcome some say was deliberately engineered by
Wingti in order to eliminate Negints as a potential rival).
The same developments that would, it was clear, split the otherwise
decisive Ulka vote also emboldened Simon Noma to make his run for the
seat. Following in his father's footsteps, he like Negints had staked his
reputation on his ability to foster economic development by stopping
tribal warfare. His (Kopia) line had not been involved in any fighting
since 1982, and since that time Simon had been instrumental in organiz-
ing the Faipela Kansil, a confederation of tribes within the five local
council areas in the Ku Waru region, including the Tea-Dena with whom
Kopia had fought in 1982, and all their other erstwhile major enemies
within the region. While regional coalitions on the Nebilyer Valley floor
lay in tatters, the much smaller, formerly warring lines in the neighboring
Ku Waru area had consolidated themselves into an effective regional
force-one that could clearly deliver a sizable block of votes for Simon,
and that they hoped would attract a good many more from disaffected
voters elsewhere in the Nebilyer Valley as well as from their allies across
the range, the Poika, Palimi, and Laulku.
As it turned out the perception (or perhaps self-fulfilling prophecy)
that Negints could not win was correct, but not the perception that
Simon could. In the event he lost badly, coming sixth in a field of ten can-
didates. The Poika and Palimi lines are said to have voted for Simon
Noma, but the Laulku vote proved a major disappointment in that only
one segment of Laulku committed its votes to Simon-the Wijangiyl seg-
ment, whose territory lies closest to Kopia (at the eastern edge of the
Kaugel Valley) and which has the highest proportion of its women mar-.
ried into Kopia and Kubuka. The three other major segments of Laulku
committed their votes to Vincent Awali, who comes from their side of the
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range, but not from their line or a closely allied one. Though a first-time
candidate, Awali won the election with 7,269 votes (25.65 percent of the
total) as against 4,870 for Negints (the first runner-up).
To add insult to injury, a Kopia man visiting the Laulku reportedly
overheard two Laulku men gloating over Awali's defeat of Simon Noma,
characterizing him and his Kopia line as nothing but "coffee buyers" (ie,
people who do not stay and work in their own place, but roam around
from one place to another-perhaps a reference to Simon's rather transi-
tory, and some would say opportunistic, relation to his home base at
Kailge). When the Kopia man came back and reported this insult to other
Kopia they were incensed, and, as one of them put it to me, "We all
planned to kill a Laulku." Shortly after, when one of the two Laulku men
who were reported to have made the insult was spotted walking through
the Ku Waru region on his way to catch a bus for Mount Hagen, he was
badly beaten up by some Kopia men, who were reportedly stopped from
killing him only by the intervention of others from the Kulka and Epola
lines (who were neutral with respect to this particular dispute).
Somewhat surprisingly, the Laulku have apparently never asked for
compensation for this bashing. Kopia people say this is because the
Laulku were afraid to in view of their own repeated postponements of the
makayl payment they had been promising over the previous three years.
Now, I was told, "we don't know if they will ever give us the payment.
We never hear about it."
A relevant consideration here is that another shift seems to have taken
place in Kopia-Kubuka marriage patterns in the sixteen years since we
first began studying them. There has been a sharp increase in marriages
between Kopia and their former enemies the Tea-Dena. Although we
recorded only two such marriages that had taken place before
1982-1983 (over the previous fifty years or so), there have been at least
seven since then.6
There has been a corresponding development in the field of makayl
ceremonial exchange-an unprecedented one at that. In 1991 we said
that to the best of our knowledge exchange had never taken place in this
area between lines who had been major enemies of each other, except in
cases where they had become allied in opposition to a common enemy.?
On my return to Kailge in 1997 I learned that in 1996 Tea-Dena had
given an initiatory payment of five pigs to their former enemies the
Kopia, to be followed up by a major return payment from Kopia to them.
As of July 1998 these plans were still in train. These groups are not joint-
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ly opposed to any other ones, and the purpose of this makayl exchange
is said to be to put an end to fighting in the area for good.
SEGMENTATION AND VIOLENCE
I have reviewed at a rather microscopic level some recent political devel-
opments within a single electorate of Papua New Guinea. What conclusions
may be drawn from them about relationships between "traditional"
segmentary structures, electoral politics, and potentials for violence?
What Saffu has called the "traditional community vote thesis"-that
"politics at all levels ... are organised along traditional structural lines"
(1996, 40)-entails that people's voting behavior will be determined
by those people's identification in terms of such "traditional" segmen-
tary categories as Kopia, Kubuka, Laulku, and so on. Insofar as electoral
boundaries such as the one between Hagen Central and Mul councils
follow traditional boundaries such as the one between the Kumndi and
Jika tribes, there is the potential for superposed levels of segmentation.
But these are viewed as elaborations of the traditional in the guise of the
new.
A contingency not taken into account by this thesis is that social
processes engendered within the higher-level social fields created by elec-
toral boundaries can disrupt relationships that have been established at
lower, more local levels within the segmentary order. This, I would say, is
what has happened to the alliance that had been developing between
Kopia-Kubuka and Laulku. To see how it worked out, suppose that the
electoral boundaries had been differently drawn. Imagine that the bound-
ary between national electorates ran along the crest of the Tambul Range,
with the whole of the Nebilyer Valley in one electorate and the whole of
the Kaugel Valley in another (maps 2 and 3). There is no reason to think
this would have had any effect on the marital alliance that had been
developing across the range between the Kopia-Kubuka and Laulku,
especially as that was well under way before the boundaries were even
drawn up for the first House of Assembly election in 1964.
Such a redrawn boundary might well have dissuaded Simon Noma (or
any other Kopia-Kubuka person) from standing for the national seat,
because it would have rendered their Kaugel-side connections irrelevant
for drawing in votes. But whether or not a Kopia candidate had stood for
the seat on the Nebilyer side, such a redrawn boundary would almost cer-
tainly have altered the course of makayl ceremonial exchange relations
between Laulku and Kopia-Kubuka, because if the two groups had not
,n:1« "
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been located in the same electorate, the conflict between them would not
have arisen.
What does all this have to do with questions of violence? Happily,
our fieldwork in the Ku Waru region over the past fifteen years has
afforded few examples of organized violence: the Kopia-Kubuka people
with whom we have lived have not been involved in any lethal clashes
since the 1940s-in stark contrast to what has happened elsewhere in
the Western Highlands, including the Nebilyer Valley floor only a few
kilometers to the east, where over a hundred people have been killed over
the past twenty years.8 But this does not mean that the Ku Waru experi-
ence is irrelevant to the question of violence. On the contrary, it is high-
ly relevant for understanding possible avenues for avoiding violence.
What has happened in the Ku Waru region over that time affords some
striking examples of locally organized, largely successful attempts to do
just that.
The most dramatic example was the ending of the 1982 "Marsupial
Road War" (the only one the Kopia have been involved in) by the inter-
vention on the battlefield of a neutral women's group, which ended it
before anyone was killed. Merlan and I have analyzed this in detail in our
book Ku Waru (I991, 190-197, 210-214; see also Rumsey 1999) and it
would be beyond the scope of this paper to go into it again. What is rel-
evant here is that one of the key enabling conditions for the women's
action, and its most brilliant innovation, was the way in which the
women assimilated their "in-between" position in the segmentary field
with that of the perceived new order of "government law" and "busi-
ness," allowing them to draw on men's interest in the new order to sup-
press conflict in the old.
The other, more recent development is the Faipela Kansil federation
among former major-enemy lines in the area, and its consolidation by the
development of makayl relations between them, where the perceived
common threat that this is intended to counteract is not any other hostile
segmentary alliance, but warfare itself.
These are extraordinary efforts at self-help against organized violence.
Even more extraordinary is that they have so far been almost entirely suc-
cessful, to the extent that it came to me as a shock in 1997 to hear that
Kopia man say of the 1992 dispute, "We planned to kill a Laulku." If the
Laulku man they assaulted had died, it could well have destroyed all the
peacemaking achievements of the Kulka Women's group and the Faipela
Kansil, because there would probably have been retaliation by Laulku
that could well have escalated into full-scale warfare.
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In the Ku Waru area, the greatest threat to peace has come not as an
aspect of local-level segmentary-political affairs, but in the disruptive
effect on them of electoral politics9 at the national level. Thus, while it is
undoubtedly true that in some cases, such as the ones discussed by
Strathern (1974), previously existing segmentary conflicts can be exacer-
bated by the coincidence of segmentary boundaries and electoral ones, it
is also true that otherwise harmonious segmentary relations can be
undermined by the inclusion of the relevant segmentary parties within a
single electorate.
I am not claiming that the elections, or electoral boundaries, were in
any simple sense the "cause" of a breakdown in relations between Kopia-
Kubuka and Laulku. By the time of my return to Kailge in 1997, electoral
politiks was, as I have said, the standard explanation that people were
offering for it. Bearing in mind Hagen Joseph Ketan's (1996,98) detailed
and convincing demonstration that what appears to be "electoral vio-
lence" is often largely grounded in preexisting segmentary tensions, I
readily concede that there may have been other, now-forgotten develop-
ments during 1990-1992 that contributed to the undermining of the ear-
lier plans for a wealth exchange between these two groups. Insofar as it
is appropriate to speak of "causes" at all in such cases, one must allow
that not all of them may be accessible to the actors' consciousness. But in
this case I see no reason not to agree with them that the elections were at
the very least a major triggering factor in the violence that followed them.
It is equally undeniable, judging from the published accounts referred
to in my opening paragraph, that elections in Papua New Guinea are
increasingly accompanied by such violence, especially in the highlands.
Later I raise the question of what, if anything, can be done about it.
Before I do that it is important to affirm that Papua New Guineans them-
selves do regard violence as a problem, though it might appear otherwise
in light of some of the understandings now widely current among
Melanesianists.
SOME MELANESIAN AND MELANESIANIST PRESPECTIVES ON
VIOLENCE
Partly in reaction against an earlier functionalist orthodoxy in which a
wide variety of human social arrangements and cultural forms were
explained as mechanisms of "social control," it is often pointed out by
anthropologists nowadays that New Guineans do not necessarily regard
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peace as a normal state of affairs and conflict as aberrant. An influential
advocate of this view has been Marilyn Strathern, who, following in part
on Fitzpatrick (1980; see also Clifford, Morauta, and Stewart 1984), has
mounted an effective challenge to the notion that warfare and exchange
are somehow inherently opposed to each other. True enough, "indigenous
orators (mediators, dispute settlers) comment that to exchange wealth is
better than to fight." But one cannot infer from this that exchange oper-
ates as a form of social control, because "an underlying premise [of such
comments] is that the two activities [wealth exchange and fighting] are
convertible. It is not simply that the exchange of gifts enables people to
settle their differences peacefully, but that either exchange or warfare can
turn into its alternative" (M Strathern 1985, 124).
In support of this view Strathern noted that wealth exchanges not only
settle differences but also "afford a facility for the mobilization of allies
in warfare. "(198 5, 123). But this does not imply that warfare and wealth
exchange are transactions of the same order, since it is clear from all
the ethnographic accounts (eg, A Strathern 1971; Meggitt 1977; Merlan
and Rumsey 1991) that the groups that oppose each other in warfare
are not normally the same ones who then exchange wealth objects.
Moreover, even to the extent that the two kinds of transactions are seen
as interconvertible, it follows that they must be seen as different. This is
amply borne out by the remarks one often hears from Highlanders to the
effect that, though it is proper to compensate the bereaved for their grief
and anger, no amount of wealth can pay for the life of a man (see, eg,
Merlan and Rumsey 1991, 168-169, 208). While "either exchange or
warfare can turn into its alternative," in our experience most Ku Waru
people most of the time place a higher moral value on exchange, and
show a greater interest (in both senses of the word) in converting hostile
relations into peaceful ones than vice versa (Merlan and Rumsey 1991,
152-154, 196).
The same is true, unsurprisingly, of public discourse at the national
level in Papua New Guinea. A look at 'the record of parliamentary pro-
ceedings and discussion in the Papua New Guinea newspapers over the
last fifteen years reveals voluminous discussion of violence as a problem.
VIOLENCE AND PROPOSALS FOR ELECTORAL REFORM
Can anything be done to counteract the tendency toward increasing vio-
lence? It would be arrogant and almost certainly futile for outsiders to try
322 THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· FALL 1999
to dream up solutions to such a perceived problem from afar. Yet I believe
that some proposals and steps under way at the national level in Papua
New Guinea have the potential to help obviate the problems I have been
discussing and to help remove some of the obstacles to local-level peace-
making efforts.
Like most former British colonies, Papua New Guinea has a system of
first-past-the-post voting, in which the candidate with the most votes (a
simple plurality) wins. The more people who run for a given office, the
smaller the winning plurality may be. For reasons that will become clear
later, one of the proposals that has often been advanced in the country to
reduce election violence (and increase the stability of governments) is a
return to the alternative system of voting that was used there until 1975,
the preferential system. Although the mechanics of preferential voting
will be well known to readers in Australia, where it has been used in fed-
eral elections since 1918, some explanation is in order for others to
whom it may be less familiar.
In a preferential system, voters do not just choose one candidate for
each office on the ballot, but are allowed or required to rank candidates
in order of preference (or to vote a party ticket on which the party's
ranking of other parties' candidates below their own is specified). In
an "optional preferential" system, the filling in of second and lower-
order preferences is voluntary, the vote retaining its validity so long as
at least a first preference is specified. In a field where there are more than
two candidates for a given office, the outcome is determined not by a
simple plurality, but by a run-off count that first eliminates the candidate
who has obtained the fewest first preferences, then the one with the
fewest first and second preferences, and so on, until one candidate has a
majority of votes remaining in the count (for illustrative examples see
Reilly 1997b).
An optional preferential system was introduced into Papua New
Guinea by the Australian colonial administration in the run-up to inde-
pendence during 1964-1975. As the 1975 deadline for independence
drew near, however, a feeling developed that the system would be too
complicated to administer, and it was abandoned in favor of a first-past-
the-post (plurality) system. This system had the undeniable advantages of
lowering the number of ballots that had to be discarded because improp-
erly filled out, and greatly simplifying the vote counting. But it also had
major disadvantages, which do not appear to have been much anticipat-
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ed before the switch. In hindsight, by comparison to the earlier preferen-
tial system, they became painfully evident. Political parties are numerous
and evanescent in Papua New Guinea, and electoral fields such as I have
described with ten or more candidates-even twenty or thirty-for a sin-
gle office are not at all uncommon. As a consequence, it is now equally
common for them to be won by a candidate with a plurality of no more
than IO-20 percent of the vote. People usually do favor their home can-
didate (per the "traditional community vote thesis"), but the effect of this
on electoral outcomes is different in the two voting systems. Under the
plurality system it results in much stronger local polarization. As
explained by former Papua New Guinea Minister Sir Anthony Siaguru:
[People] consider themselves to be bound by social and family obligations to
cast their first vote for their relative or a person from their own clan, house
line or language group. It might not be that that person is the best candidate
in the judgement of the voter! But he or she is obliged because of social tra-
ditions to vote for him. I know of elections in the past, when the optional pref-
erential system was used, where candidates went around the electorate saying
"Don't vote for me as your first choice. I know you will have to give your first
choice to your line candidate. But give me second." And they did get in on sec-
ond preferences or third preferences. They did it with far greater representa-
tive support than, say, the member who has got in with less that ten percent
of the vote. That is ridiculous. (Siaguru, quoted in Dorney I990, 78-79)
During I982-I988, Siaguru led a campaign for electoral reform that
included as one of its main planks a return to optional preferential vot-
ing (for details see Reilly I996, 49-54). In I986 he moved a private mem-
ber's bill to reintroduce that system for the I987 elections. It failed to win
the necessary two-thirds vote, but many of the members who voted
against it said that they favored the preferential system, that they were
voting against the bill only because there wasn't time to implement it in
the six months before the election, and that they would support the bill
if Siaguru reintroduced it after the election (Reilly I996, 52).
Unfortunately he did not have the chance, as he lost his seat that year.
While that particular campaign dissolved with Siaguru's defeat, inter-
est in his proposal has been revived several times since then. In one
province, Manus, it was reinstituted on an experimental basis for the
I993 provincial elections, and was widely regarded as a success (PNG
Electoral Commission I996; Reilly I998, I35-I36). In I995 the PNG
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Cabinet agreed that the 1997 national election would be held under an
optional preferential system (PNG Electoral Commission 1995, I).
Legislation was drafted, but in the event it was never brought to a vote
in Parliament, apparently because "Prime Minister Chan was unable to
convince his back bench that a change of electoral system would not
harm their own interests" (Reilly 1998, 137). Though the proposal seems
unlikely to succeed in the foreseeable future, pressure for change is likely
to continue. For example, a Commonwealth Observer Mission report on
the 1997 PNG elections recommended that "given the number of candi-
dates contesting elections in Papua New Guinea, serious consideration
should be given to alternative systems of voting" (Commonwealth
Secretariat 1997, quoted in Reilly 1998, 138).
SOME POSSIBLE BENEFITS OF PREFERENTIAL VOTING
This is not the place for a detailed discussion of proposals for electoral
reform, or for launching into a full defense of them.l0 Suffice it to say
that, based on his careful study of the way preferential systems have
worked in Papua New Guinea before 1975 (compare Siaguru's quoted
remarks), in Manus in 1993, and elsewhere in the world where they are
in use (especially in ethnically divided societies such as Fiji and Sri
Lanka), Ben Reilly has found that, as compared with the first-past-the-
post system, the preferential one:
• increases the chance of election of candidates with wider
appeal ... ;
• encourages accommodation between competing interests .. ;
• produces incentives for candidates to broaden support bases in
search of a majority vote, and to collaborate during campaigning,
thus reducing conflict and changing the nature of election cam-
paigns ... ;
• rewards reciprocal concessions between competing groups, thus
encouraging conciliatory positions and moderate policies . . . ;
• negates the advantages of dummy candidates standing to "split" an
opposition block vote, thus (presumably) resulting in lower levels of
overall candidature;
• results in candidates being elected with a considerably higher pro-
portion of the vote than plurality, thus increasing the legitimacy of
the elected legislature. (Reilly 1996, 61-62)
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Other commentators, while not necessarily rejecting the arguments in
favor of a preferential system, have pointed out that its successful imple-
mentation in Manus was facilitated by features unique to that province:
its relative isolation, small population, high literacy, and ease of access by
government officials to most of its constituencies (Yaw Saffu, quoted in
PNG Electoral Commission 1996, 3). William Standish, a long-time
observer of PNG electoral politics who had previously favored the rein-
troduction of the preferential system, concluded after being present for
1992 elections in Simbu Province (in the Central Highlands) that such a
system "would be too complex for both the electoral staff in this province
and the scrutineers and candidates" (1996, 320).
Based on my own (more limited) experience of elections in the Western
Highlands, I agree that a change to the preferential system would be dif-
ficult to implement there too-much more so than on Manus, for the rea-
sons suggested earlier. But I am not convinced that the difficulties would
be insurmountable. Though the parallel is not an exact one, a study of the
1987 election in Australia's Northern Territory, where the preferential
system is used as elsewhere in Australia, offers some hope. Examining the
results from four remote Aboriginal settlements, where the literacy rate is
probably no higher than in the New Guinea Highlands, the researcher
found that rates of informal votes (those that have to be discarded
because of improperly filled out ballots or other irregularities) for the
four communities straddled the average figure for rural polling places
elsewhere in the territory: 7.8 percent (Loveday 1987).11 By way of com-
parison, the average rate of informal votes for the country as a whole for
that election was 4.35 percent (Australian Electoral Commission, per-
sonal communication, 1998).
On the evidence it would seem to me that a necessary and sufficient
condition for the preferential system to work in any part of Papua New
Guinea would be for enough of the people there to learn (or recall) how
it works, become convinced of its advantages over the present system,
and have the will to make it succeed. To see why they might be amenable
to it, and to provide a concrete example of how the system might work,
I return to the Ku Waru case of postelection violence discussed earlier.
Under the present first-past-the-post system, Laulku voters were placed
in an inescapable bind. Each of them had to cast a single vote, which
in almost every case was either for their "home candidate," Vincent
Awali, or for Simon Noma, from their allied tribe Kopia on the other side
of the Tambul Range. Because most of them chose the former option
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and Awali won the election, the Kopia felt betrayed and retaliated
accordingly, which ended the emerging makayl relationship between the
two groups.
Under a preferential system, which in multicandidate electorates great-
ly reduces the chances of winning on the home vote alone, it would
appear much less likely that both Simon Noma and Vincent Awali would
have been running. But even if they had, the Laulku voters would not
have been placed in such a bind, because instead of an all-or-nothing
choice they could have given their first preference to one of the two
favored candidates and their second preference to the other, in full knowl-
edge that the success of either would depend mainly on the breadth of his
support outside his own home area. Indeed, the two candidates might
well have worked out an arrangement like the one recalled by Siaguru,
where they would campaign together to secure for each the second pref-
erences of voters in the home area of the other.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article I have tried to do two things. First, drawing on Ku Waru
examples I have tried to clarify the nature of the relationship between the
forms and processes of social segmentation that have arisen specifically in
the context of electoral politics, and those that have given rise to group-
ings of longer standing such as Kopia-Kubuka and Laulku. Against the
"traditional community vote thesis," I have tried to show that politics at
these two levels cannot be organized entirely "along traditional structur-
al lines" once fixed electoral boundaries are introduced, because these
create an absolute, "top-down" frame of reference to which the former-
ly more relativistic, bottom-up segmentary structures must be made to
conform.12 This is not to say that the new, top-down structures have
simply displaced the older ones, but that neither form of politics can be
articulated with the other without a substantial impact on both. In other
words, pure "upward colonization" is not possible (any more than
simple displacement of local traditions by the downward thrust of central
authority).
The other, more practical point of the article is to bring the same
ethnographic evidence to bear on arguments that have been made by
others for a return to preferential voting in Papua New Guinea-in
particular on the argument that it would help to reduce conflict over
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elections-a claim that is supported by the Ku Waru evidence. My
argument is not that postelection violence is an inevitable consequence
of the present voting system, or that the system could operate without
fixed electoral boundaries, or that violence is always the result of outside
pressures. Rather, it is that, in the course of intergroup political life
among the Ku Waru people at least, there are many situations in which
people will generally choose the "path of peace" (molupa kunsuyl
kupulam) over a more destructive course of action (see Rumsey 1999),
and that the reintroduction of preferential voting would help to remove
certain obstacles to that path.
There is a one-way relationship between this argument about voting
systems and the other, more theoretical one about "upward" versus
"downward" colonization: the theoretical argument supports the practi-
cal one, but does not depend on it. That is, Reilly and I could be wrong
about the palliative potential of preferential voting without thereby inval-
idating my more general argument about the impact of the state on local
politics. But another lesson can be drawn from the Ku Waru case that
pertains to both of these arguments: Outside observers of the New
Guinea scene tend to regard law and order as something that has to be
imposed from above by the state in order to suppress a local-level
propensity toward violence-especially in the highlands. But from the
examples discussed here (see also Rumsey 1999) it is clear that local-level
peacemaking efforts by Highlanders have been confounded by a particu-
lar state instrumentality-a system of voting-that has been delivered to
them from above. From a Ku Waru standpoint, what would seem to be
needed are structural changes to that instrumentality to make it more
compatible with the initiatives that have been taken from below.
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Notes
1 Paney 1973; Standish 1973, 1994; Gordon and Meggitt 1985; Wormsley
and Toke 1985; A Strathern 1977, 1984, 1992, 1993.
2 Standish 1976, 1983, 1989, 1992, 1996; Burton 1989; Ketan 1995, 1996,
1998; Yasi 1996; Saffu 1996.
3 If is not clear whether anyone has ever propounded this thesis in its pure
form. Saffu (1996, 40) cited Ketan (1996) as its most "relentless" advocate, but
Ketan's own formulations do allow for some reciprocal interplay between the
two levels, as do most of Andrew Strathern's, including the quote from Strathern
(1974), in which it is clear that "segmentary" cannot be equated with "tradi-
tional structural." Elsewhere Strathern has explicitly pointed out that "the very
processes that link local clans to the state also produce within and between clans
a heightened potential for conflict through competition for resources and politi-
cal office" (1993, 57). But the emphasis in the literature, and the thrust of the
ethnographic examples chosen, has generally been more in the "upward" direc-
tion of this process than the "downward" one. And at least some of the formu-
lations in the literature do seem to lend themselves to a unidirectionalist reading,
as for example Strathern's claim that "[c]lans seem to treat the state, national,
and provincial authorities as another clan and to direct their demands against all
entities in the outside world in the exact way they do against their immediate
neighbours" (1993, 55).
4 For similar cases elsewhere in Papua New Guinea see Salisbury 1956;
Healey 1986; Hide 1981, 181-205.
5 See Merlan and Rumsey 1991: pages 50-55 for the land dispute; 1-8 and
122-155 for the war; and 28-30 and 158-160 for the business ventures.
6 I say "at least" because, unlike our figures for 1982-1983, this one is not
based on a complete census of Kopia, but merely on all the recent examples of
such marriages that could be quickly recalled by a handful of Kopia informants
(during a brief field trip to Kailge in 1998). It is possible that a new full census
would turn up additional cases.
7 Merlan and Rumsey 1991, 207; compare Strathern (1971, 90) on the
Melpa, and Meggitt (1977) on the Enga.
8 Some of this fighting will be known to some readers through its vivid por-
trayal in the film Black Harvest, made in the Nebilyer Valley by Bob Connolly
and Robin Anderson in the late 1980s.
9 The 1997 elections were also an occasion for new threats of violence, this
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time involving guns. After saying he would run again for the Tambul-Nebilyer
seat until well into the run-up period for the election, Simon Noma pulled out at
the last minute, urging his supporters to vote instead for a Kulka candidate, Fred
Kuman. Many of them voted for Kuman, but according to my informants, they
actually wanted Thomas Negints to win, and voted for Kuman only because his
Kulka supporters had threatened to attack them with their high-powered rifles if
they did not. Leaders of the Kubuka line stood up to this threat and openly urged
their people to vote for Negints, which they did, along with many people from
the Tea-Dena and Kusika-Midipu lines. When Kuman lost the election, coming
in fifth (behind Negints, who was third), some Kulka men put up a roadblock to
prevent people from those lines traveling back and forth to Mount Hagen, and
they were forced to use a less direct route.
10 See instead recent works by Ben Reilly (1996; 1997a; 1997b; 1998).
I I An additional factor is that in order to help make up for these Aboriginal
voters' presumed lesser familiarity with voting procedures, "assisted voting" was
allowed, whereby illiterate voters could be accompanied into the polling booth
by a designated assistant who was allowed to explain the ballot to them and help
them fill it out. But in Loveday's sample only one voter in five made use of this
option.
12 As one of the referees for this article has rightly pointed out, attempts by
the state to freeze land boundaries among segmentary groups have also been a
factor in many of the conflicts that have arisen among them in Papua New
Guinea as in other colonial and postcolonial regimes. This happens not to have
been a factor in the case I have discussed here, because Kopia-Kubuka and
Laulku lands are separated by a wide band of uninhabited montane forest (map
2) and the "boundary" between them is unproblematical. In any case the gov-
ernment's ability to arbitrate land disputes in the Ku Waru region has been weak
or nonexistent in the postcolonial era (see, eg, Merlan and Rumsey 1991, 51),
and there is no evidence for its having been a factor in any of the wars that
Kopia-Kubuka people have fought over the past sixty years (Merlan and Rumsey
1991,45-5 6).
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Abstract
Over the past quarter century there has been a resurgence of warfare in the New
Guinea Highlands. Much of this warfare and other violence has occurred at the
interface between electoral politics and more "traditional" forms of segmentary
social organization: tribes, clans, and the like. It has been seen by some scholars
as a matter of "upward colonization," whereby local political traditions have
penetrated the state. Although this view is illuminating, it has its limits: in prac-
tice, state and local forms of politics cannot be articulated with each other with-
out having a substantial impact on both. Here I illustrate this ethnographically,
drawing on case materials from the Ku Waru region, Western Highlands
Province. Tracing the history of marital and ceremonial exchange relations
between two Ku Waru groups over the past two generations, I show how an
emerging alliance between them was undermined by a conflict of interest over
the 1992 national election. Although such conflicts could never be avoided alto-
gether, I argue that they could be reduced by a change from the present first-past-
the-post voting system to a preferential system.
KEYWORDS: Papua New Guinea, politics, segmentary groups, violence, voting
